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Letters

IA OVERSIGHT LACKING

With the war on terrorism in full swing and no end in sight, the Navy continues to employ sailors in individual augmentee assignments [“Facing a sailor surplus,” May 11]. I thoroughly enjoyed my time serving with two Army units in Baghdad. But this letter is not about me, it’s about the sailors who are serving in IA assignments today.

The Navy has gone to great lengths to provide a solid system for ensuring IAs have the information they need to be successful.

As a command individual augmentee coordinator, it is my responsibility to maintain contact with deployed sailors and their families. This is a duty I take most seriously. I was one of the ones who was not supported very well by a previous command, so I’ve seen the bad side of the CIAC program. The program will continue to fail if CIACs are not held accountable. Yes, written directives dictate the duties, but oversight is lacking. Where are the commands who want to take care of all their sailors, even the ones sent on an IA [tour]?

I submit to you that there are still numerous Navy commands that are failing their sailors. Why is this happening? Is it ignorance? Hardly so; the requirement to maintain accountability of our IAs has been mandated.

When I contact a CIAC and ask about one of their sailors who have been deployed on an IA for months, and they’ve never contacted them or don’t even know how to contact them, the system is broken.

I spoke last week with a mother who has a son on an IA assignment; she was shocked that I had contacted her and inquired about her and her son’s well-being. Her son had been gone for four months and hadn’t heard from his parent command. I surmise that this is not an isolated incident. Who’s to blame? The CIAC, as well as the leadership of that sailor’s command.

All naval leadership should pay closer attention to the IA program and hold the CIACs accountable.

AWOCS (AW/NAC) Loy Hower

Whidbey Island, Wash.

INSURV: WHO’S ACCOUNTABLE?

Six ships unfit; 27 could not fight fires; 35 had ignored fuel leaks. What in the name of Adm. Chester Nimitz is going on in our great Navy? [“Fleet flaws exposed,” May 4] Can you imagine if that was the case in World War II, when we had hardly any ships able to fight the war?

I cannot believe we have such sorry people aboard our Navy ships. After the great heroic effort by the Navy SEALs dispatching the pirates, we have to read that our ships are not ready to take the fight to the enemy.

Lt. Leonard J. Vsetecka (ret.)

Brunswick, Ga.

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In response to the editorial [“Keep InSurv public,” May 4], I strongly believe that results [of the Board of Inspection and Survey] should be kept public and not veiled in secrecy.

What I don’t agree with is the idea that Navy leadership should be held responsible for the condition of the fleet.

To understand the InSurv concept, one needs to go back to the original purpose: to be an independent report to the chief of naval operations and, more importantly, to Congress of the true condition of the fleet and the trends that are a direct result of the financial support the fleet is getting. The ultimate responsibility lies in the congressional mandate that has consistently eroded support. What we’ve seen is a steady decline in available ship assets and funding support, and yet the operating requirements have remained and, in some instances, [such as homeland security duties] actually increased.

Punishment for the improper maintenance of ships has two debilitating results. First, there is a tendency to hide true failures from the InSurv inspectors. If the equipment works during the day of the inspection, but it has been consistently inoperative, it should be reported as a deficiency. Regrettably, it’s not.

The second is that there’s a tendency to “groom” ships for upcoming InSurvs. The result is a report that the condition of the fleet is better than what it really is.

I recommend that the InSurv board not be in the business of judging the effectiveness of the ship’s sailors, but rather, form a partnership with them and encourage them to report the true condition of their ship.

Capt. Tem E. Bugarin (ret.)

Chula Vista, Calif.

STAY-OR-GO BOARDS FOR ALL

Exempting SEALs, divers, fleet, force and command master chiefs, etc., from continuation boards is saying they are beyond reproach [“8,000 chiefs face the boot,” April 20]. Historically, even senior flag officers made wrong judgments and were forced to retire, some even losing a star or two in the process. Why is that not possible with SEAL chiefs, for example, according to the new review process?

No one is above reproach. Anyone can make a bad judgment. I think the master chief petty officer of the Navy is implementing a dangerous double standard by exempting certain chief specialties and positions from continuation reviews.

Lt. Cmdr. Mladen K. Vranjican (ret.)

Jacksonville, Fla.

AVIATION SUPPORT NEEDED

An overhaul of aviation support for our naval special warfare community is paramount and should not be limited to [helicopters] [“Helicopter plan would create elite spec-ops support units,” April 27]. This should be a Naval Air Enterprise solution, which would encompass both active and reserve rotary and fixed wing forces.

I fail to see how two reserve helicopter squadrons can support naval special warfare units spread across Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa. Considering that special warfare units have been operating in these areas since 2002, it is an understatement to say that the Navy and Naval Air Enterprise have reacted slowly to this issue.

This proposed solution smacks of an entitlement mentality, supporting the naval special warfare mission as it is currently defined. A better solution would be to have a mix of active and reserve rotary-wing and fixed-wing support.

Cmdr. Kevin J. Sudbeck

Monterey, Calif.