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USS NEW ORLEANS

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SUBJ/INSURV REPORT FOR USS NEW ORLEANS (LPD 18) FINAL CONTRACT TRIAL (FCT)/ REF/A/DOC/OPNAVINST 4700.8H/5 DEC 1990/

AMPN/REF A IS OPNAV POLICY ON TRIALS, ACCEPTANCE, COMMISSIONING, FITTING OUT, SHAKEDOWN, AND POST-SHAKEDOWN AVAILABILITY OF U.S. NAVAL SHIPS UNDERGOING CONSTRUCTION OR CONVERSION./

RMKS/1. THE BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY CONDUCTED AN FCT OF USS NEW ORLEANS (LPD 18) AT SAN DIEGO, CA DURING THE PERIOD 11-15 AUG 08.

2. SENIOR MEMBER COMMENTS: A. USS NEW ORLEANS WAS DEGRADED IN HER ABILITY TO CONDUCT SUSTAINED COMBAT OPERATIONS. REQUEST PMS 317 RESCHEDULE FULL POWER, QUICK REVERSALS, STEERING AND SD DTE DEMOS WITH INSURV.

B. MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE EQUIPMENT TO SAFELY CONDUCT UNDERWAY OPS WAS ACHIEVED AT 1715 ON DAY 2 OF THE TRIAL. USS NEW ORLEANS WAS DELIVERED TO THE NAVY IN DEC 06, AND THE BUILDER WARRANTY EXPIRED IN DEC 07. INSURV SCRIBED 2687 ELECTRONIC TRIAL CARDS (ETC) OF WHICH 101 CARDS WERE CARRIED OVER FROM THE ACCEPTANCE TRIAL (AT) CONDUCTED IN DEC 06. THERE WERE 63 PART 1 SAFETIES IDENTIFIED. USS NEW ORLEANS COMPLETED POST-SHAKEDOWN AVAILABILITY (PSA) IN JUN 08. THE SHIP IS HOMEPORTED ON THE WEST COAST.

C. THE SHIP CANNOT SUPPORT EMBARKED TROOPS, CARGO, OR LANDING CRAFT. SERIOUS MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES EXIST IN THE WELL DECK AND VEHICLE STOWAGE AREAS. 25 OF 34 WELL DECK VENTILATION FANS WERE INOP. THE SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION OF INSTALLED SUPPLY/EXHAUST VENTILATION SYSTEMS IN THESE AREAS HAS BEEN AN LPD CLASS PROBLEM AND IS A SERIOUS SAFETY CONCERN WHEN TRANSPORTING/LOADING LANDING CRAFT. 2 OF 3 VEHICLE RAMPS WERE INOP. THE TRAVELING WELL DECK CRANE WAS INOP. ADDITIONALLY, HINGED RAMP CASUALTIES WILL NOT ALLOW WHEELED VEHICLES TO PASS BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PLATFORMS OR TO STOW VEHICLES ON TOP OF THE RAMPS IN A CARGO LOAD OUT CONFIGURATION.

D. 2 OF 3 CARGO WEAPONS ELEVATORS AND 1 OF 2 DUMBWAITERS WERE OOC BECAUSE OF VARIOUS ISSUES LISTED IN SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL DISCREPANCIES. WITH THE REDUCED WEIGHT HANDLING CAPACITY, MEU AND LANDING FORCE OPERATIONAL MATERIAL (LFORM) LOADOUT TIME IS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED, AFFECTING TIME TO SURGE ON SHORT NOTICE. ADDITIONALLY, DAILY FOOD BREAKOUTS WILL REQUIRE CARRYING THE BREAKOUT UP 7 DECKS TO THE GALLEY, INCREASING CHANCES OF SAFETY INCIDENTS.

E. THE SHIP’S SELF DEFENSE CAPABILIES WERE SEVERELY DEGRADED BY THE FOLLOWING SYSTEM DEFICIENCIES: AN/SPS-48E AIR SEARCH RADAR ELECTRONIC COOLING WATER (ECW) TEMPERATURE AND FLOW REQUIRED REGULATING VALVES TO BE MANUALLY MANIPULATED. THE SHIP REQUIRED SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE BY ISEA REP IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN RADAR PERFORMANCE. SHIP DISABLED THE OXYGEN SENSOR SYSTEM AUDIBLE ALARM BECAUSE IT CONTINUOUSLY SOUNDED AS A RESULT OF ENTRAINED OXYGEN IN THE SYSTEM, WHICH DISABLED ALL OTHER COOLING AUDIBLE ALARMS, INCLUDING HIGH TEMP, LOW LEVEL, LOW PRESSURE, LOW FLOW, AND LOW RESISTIVITY. AN/SLQ-32 WAS AVAILABLE ONLY FOR MAINTENANCE, TESTING AND LIMITED OPERATION BECAUSE ANTENNA ENCLOSURE DIFFERENTIAL AIR PRESSURE IS BELOW SPEC. AN/SPQ-9B RADAR DETECTION RANGE WAS REDUCED BELOW THE 90% ANTICIPATED RADAR DETECTION RANGE BASED ON AREPS DATA. SLQ-32 POWER ADEQUATE TO RAM WEAPON SYSTEM WAS NOT ACHIEVED FOR PORT SIDE AIRCRAFT PRESENTATION.

F. A SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL DISCREPANCY WAS NOTED DURING THE TWO FWD RAM ENGAGEMENT ATTEMPTS WHEN SSDG NR 1 AND NR 2 BLOW IN DOORS OPENED AND BOTH SSDGS STOPPED AFTER THE TOXIC GAS VENT DAMPERS (AMR 1) WERE CLOSED. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS NOT OBSERVED DURING ANY OF THE PREVIOUS LPD 17 CLASS TRIALS. IN ADDITION, DURING THE FIRST AIRCRAFT INBOUND PRESENTATION, EACH RAM LAUNCHER FIRED ONE MISSILE AND THEN A MOMENTARY LOSS OF POWER REQUIRED RESET OF BOTH RAM SYSTEMS. IT IS UNKNOWN AS TO WHETHER THE LOSS OF SSDGS AND SHUTDOWN OF BOTH RAM SYSTEMS DURING THE FIRST PRESENTATION ARE RELATED.

G. THE SHIP’S MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEMS WERE UNRELIABLE THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL. NR 1B MPDE FAILED TO START BECAUSE OF ELECTRONIC GOVERNOR FAILURE. NR 2 MRG MAGNETIC PICKUP SPEED SHAFT RPM INDICATOR WAS INOP. NR 2B MPDE RIGHT HAND TURBO CHARGER HAD 3 SEQUENTIAL TURBO CHARGER (STC) FAULTS ON ECS. BIMBA VALVES INSTALLED IN NR 1A MPDE FUEL FILTER ASSEMBLY LEAKED AT A RATE OF 45 DROPS PER MINUTE. THESE CASUALTIES DELAYED UNDERWAY DEPARTURE BY 10 HOURS AND DISRUPTED THE FULL POWER, QUICK REVERSAL AND STEERING DEMOS.

H. STEERING HAD SEVERAL ONGOING DEFICIENCIESS THAT REQUIRE RESOLUTION. THESE INCLUDE: BLOCKING VALVE FAILURE, EXCESSIVE SCORING ON THE STBD RAM AND METAL SHAVINGS FOUND IN HPU FILTER. DESPITE RECEIVING MULTIPLE STONINGS, THE STBD RAM STILL HAS SCORING. THE BLOCKING VALVE FAILS WHILE AT LEFT RUDDER IN THE ASTERN DIRECTION FOR BOTH HPU’S. POWER FILL AND DRAIN PUMP WAS OOC. THE ONLY EMERGENCY BACK-UP WAS THE EMERGENCY HAND PUMP WHICH WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE OF TEMPORARY FILTERS INSTALLED. PORT AND STBD HPU’S WERE OPERATORING IN ALARM CONDITION WITH LOW ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE. DURING OPEN AND INSPECT OF STBD STEERING HPU FILTER, METAL SHAVINGS AND DEBRIS WERE FOUND IN OIL AND FILTER CARTRIDGE.

I. ALTHOUGH NOT OBSERVED BY THE BOARD, THE SHIP REPORTED PROBLEMS WITH 3 MAJOR SHIP’S SERVICE DISTRIBUTION BREAKERS (NR 5 SSDG GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER, LC 41-31 BT BREAKER, 4S-5S BT BREAKER) THAT AFFECT THE RELIABILITY OF THE 60 HZ DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM. ADDITIONALLY, THE SHIP WAS NOT ABLE TO DEMO LOAD SHEDDING, BUT REPORTED UP TO 25% OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS FAILING TO OPEN WHEN REQUIRED AND 6 CIRCUIT BREAKERS INADVERTENTLY TRIPPED DURING LOAD SHED TESTING.

J. SHIP'S ABILITY TO SUPPORT STANDARD THIRD FLEET EXPEDITIONARY STRIKE GROUP (ESG) COMMUNICATIONS PLAN WITH AVAILABLE ASSETS WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE OF HF AND VHF SYSTEM DEFICIENCES AND LOSS OF COMMUNICATION SYSTEM REDUNDANCY. IN ADDITION, 2 OF 4 SATCOM SYSTEMS WERE DEGRADED. SPECIFIC DISCREPANCIES LISTED IN COMMUNICATIONS SECTION OF REPORT.

K. EMI CERTIFICATION WAS NOT COMPLETE (CLASS ISSUE, STARRED CARD FROM AT). SHIP REQUIRED THE FOLLOWING EMI FIXES: AN/SPS-48 TO WSC-8 FC 14, HF TO SPS-73, DEGAUSSING SYSTEM TO DFGMC, MV-103-DG CABLE INTERFACE WAS NOT INSTALLED, HANDHELD VHF/UHF RADIOS TO TITANIUM FIRE PUMPS, WSC-8 TO SLQ-32 FC 22, WSC-6 TO SLQ-32 X-BAND MODE. 4 OF 4 AS-2815 SSR-1 UHF SATCOM ANTENNAS WERE MISSING EMI GASKETS. TV-DTS WAS SUSCEPTIBLE TO INTERFERENCE FROM AN/SPS-48E AIR SEARCH RADAR WHICH CAUSES LNB FAILURE (NO EMI FIX WAS AVAILABLE). HF IMI COULD NOT BE DEMONSTRATED BECAUSE OF HFRG ANTENNA ISSUES. SPECIFIC DEFICIENCIES ARE LISTED IN COMMUNICATIONS SECTION OF REPORT. EMP WAS ASSESSED DURING ACCEPTANCE TRIAL AND REVEALED THE FOLLOWING OPEN DEFICIENCIES: 25 OF 81 CABLES TESTED (31%) USING THE PULSE CURRENT TEST PROCEDURE MEASURED BELOW 60 DB, FAILING TO MEET GROUNDING EFFECTIVENESS OF 60 DB OR GREATER WHICH IS CONTRACTUALLY REQUIRED FOR LPD CLASS SHIPS. 20 CABLES MEASURED FROM 40 TO 59 DB (25%) AND 5 MEASURED BELOW 40 DB (6%). L. COLLECTIVE PROTECTIVE SYSTEM (CPS) HAS NOT BEEN FULLY DEMONSTRATED BECAUSE OF VARIOUS SYSTEM COMPONENT FAILURES (SUPPLY AND EXHAUST FAN DAMPERS), LACK OF MAINTENANCE ON NAVY STANDARD IMPINGEMENT FILTERS (NSIF), SOCK PREFILTERS, AND INCOMPLETE INSTALLATION.

M. MAIN AND SECONDARY DRAINAGE WAS UNSATISFACTORY. SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES ARE LISTED IN THIS REPORT.

N. 2 OF 2 STERN TUBE SEALS LEAKED IN EXCESS OF 5 GPH (DFS 0009-08).

O. THE EXPECTED EFFICIENCY AND MAINTAINABILITY OF SEVEN AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS ONBOARD WILL BE A CHALLENGE FOR THE SHIP. IN A WORST CASE SCENARIO, THE SHIP WILL REQUIRE FOUR A/C UNITS ONLINE TO ENSURE PROPER CHILLED WATER IS SUPPLIED FOR VITAL LOADS. THE SHIP DESIGN REQUIRES 6 A/C UNITS ONLINE TO SUPPLY BOTH VITAL AND NON-VITAL LOADS. THE SHIP PRESENTLY HAS CHILLED WATER MIGRATION ISSUES WHICH LEADS TO HOT SPOTS AND AFFECTS

SURVIVABILITY. ADDITIONALLY, 3 OF 3 CHLORINATOR SYSTEMS WERE INOP. WITHOUT INSTALLED OPERATIONAL CHLORINATORS, THE A/C SYSTEM WILL BE DEGRADED WITHIN A YEAR BECAUSE OF FOULING OF THE SEA WATER COOLING SYSTEM. 7 OF 7 A/C CONDENSERS WERE RECENTLY CLEANED AND SEVERAL HUNDRED POUNDS OF MARINE GROWTH WAS REMOVED FROM THE CONDENSERS.

P. SIGNIFICANT ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC CABLE PLANT INSTALLATION DEFICIENCIES EXIST. DEAD-ENDED CABLES, CABLES IMPROPERLY BUNDLED AND BANDED, CABLES EXCEEDING NESTING CAPACITY, INADEQUATE PACKING OF CABLES AT WATERTIGHT PENETRATIONS, INADEQUATE SUPPORT BRACKETS, AND LOOSE COILED CABLES FOR FUTURE INSTALLS REMAIN UNCORRECTED FROM AT.

Q. 5 OF 5 SSDG ENCLOSURES HAD ELECTRICAL JUNCTION BOXES AND CONTROLLERS LOCATED BELOW DECKPLATE LEVEL. ADDITIONALLY, THE CONTROLLERS WERE DIFFICULT TO OPEN BECAUSE OF DECKPLATE SUPPORT STRUCTURE INTERFERENCES.

R. TANK LEVEL INDICATING (TLI) SYSTEM DOES NOT HAVE PMS COVERAGE. PERSONNEL HAVE NOT RECEIVED TRAINING IN VALIDATING TLI ACCURACY AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES.

S. 8 OF 14 HOT WATER HEATERS HAD THERMAL IMAGING DISCREPANCIES. THERE WAS NO PMS COVERAGE TO INSPECT HEATING ELEMENT CONNECTION BOXES.

T. AFT ADVANCED ENCLOSED MAST SYSTEMS (AEMS) LADDER WAS DECERTIFIED FOR CLIMBING AND THE MOTOR CONTROLLER AND HOIST MECHANISM WERE INOP (CASREP 08027). A COMPLETE MAST INSPECTION COULD NOT BE PERFORMED.

U. FWD AND AFT AEMS HAD RECURRING CLASS WIDE SAFETY AND RELIABILITY DISCREPANCIES. SEE OPERATIONS SECTION OF THIS REPORT.

V. LPD 17 CLASS ISSUE WITH AN/SPS-73(V)13 SURFACE SEARCH RADAR REMOTE RADAR PROCESSORS IS THE LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH RADAR CONTROLLED BRIDGE WORKSTATIONS (CLASS ADVISORY 25-08). RAYTHEON ADVISORY BULLETIN AND CLASS ADVISORY 25-08 DESCRIBE A RE-BOOT PROCEDURE TO RESTORE COMMUNICATIONS. NO CSOSS PROCEDURE WAS INSTALLED TO PROVIDE SHIPS FORCE A PERMANENT PROCEDURE, BUT CSOSS UPDATES ARE BEING PLANNED. CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR THE RADAR PROCESSOR IS BEING WORKED, BUT RESOLUTION OF THE IBS/VMS DISPLAY INTEGRATION ISSUE CONTRIBUTING TO THE LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS HAS YET TO BE ADDRESSED.

W. AFT MK46 30MM FIRING ZONE WAS OBSTRUCTED BY AN HF WHIP ANTENNA INSTALLED ON THE 04 LVL WEATHER DECK (ANTENNA WAS INSTALLED BY SPAWAR DURING PSA). THE CURRENT FIRING CUT-OUT WINDOW IS INSTALLED IAW APPROVED NSWC DAHLGREN DRAWINGS. X. NAVIGATION CERTIFICATION WAS INCOMPLETE BECAUSE FWD WSN-7 WAS OOC (CASREP 08040).

Y. UPON LOSS OF SHIPS POWER, ELECTRONICALLY SOUNDED BELL AND GONG COULD NOT BE MANUALLY ACTIVATED IAW COLREGS RULE 33 BECAUSE EACH SYSTEM DOES NOT HAVE BATTERY BACKUP.

Z. IN NORMAL CONFIGURATION, NAVSSI AND SWAN EDGE SWITCH (IP-NDU 5B) INTERFACED OPERATIONS CAUSE INVALID NAVIGATION DATA TO NAVIGATION DATA DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (NDDS) USERS INCLUDING RAM, TACAN, SSDS, IFF, WSC-8, PILOT HOUSE AND BRIDGE WING QUAD INDICATOR PANELS, BRIDGE IBS WORKSTATIONS AND THE CHART ROOM GYRO REPEATER (CASREP 08067). IN ADDITION, DURING TROUBLESHOOTING EFFORTS, SHIPS FORCE COULD NOT MONITOR STATUS OF IP-NDU 5B ON THE SHIPBOARD STATUS MONITORING SYSTEM NDDS DETAILED STATUS SCREEN AND SHIPS FORCE WAS NOT PROVIDED COMPLETE SET OF TECHNICAL MANUALS FOR NAVSSI.

AA. CSOSS DID NOT ACCURATELY DEPICT CONFIGURATION OF SHIPS NAVIGATION INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION.

AB. RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF GALLEY OPERATIONS BECAUSE OF DEGRADATION OF GREASE INTERCEPTOR HOOD (GIH) SYSTEM. SPECIFICALLY: 8 OF 8 CREW'S GALLEY GIH FAIL-SAFE SWITCHES AND 4 OF 4 REMOTE FIRE TOGGLE SWITCHES FAILED TO SECURE VENTILATION BECAUSE OF A PROGRAM LOGIC COMPUTER (PLC) PROGRAMMING ERROR.

AC. SEVERAL SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT WERE NOT INSTALLED, OR COMPLETELY INSTALLED, RESULTING IN 84 TAG OUT RECORDS SHEETS (TORS) REMAINING OPEN SINCE DEC 06. 49 OF THOSE 84 TORS STILL HAVE REPAIR ACTIVITY SIGNATURES FROM THE BUILDER AND CANNOT BE CLEARED WITHOUT GUIDANCE FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY ON EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION STATUS. THE ADDITIONAL MANPOWER REQUIRED TO AUDIT THESE CHECKS WEEKLY CREATES A BURDEN ON AN ALREADY REDUCED CREW.

AD. 2 OF 2 ANESTHESIA MACHINES VENTED ANESTHETIC GASES INTO THE OPERATING ROOM SPACES. SURGERY MISSION IS NOT POSSIBLE WITH CURRENT CONFIGURATION.

AE. 7 OF 7 SURGICAL LIGHTS IN OPERATING ROOMS NR 1 AND NR 2 WERE NOT HARD WIRED AND WERE INOP.

AF. A/C WAS INOP IN 2 OF 2 OPERATING ROOMS AND POSITIVE PRESSURE COULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED.

AG. 3 OF 3 COMPRESS MELT UNITS HAD NOT BEEN TURNED OVER TO THE SHIP AND WERE NOT DEMONSTRATED. AH. LARGE PULPER COULD NOT BE DEMONSTRATED DUE AN OUT OF CALIBRATION DIFFERENTIAL SWITCH AND A BROKEN OVERFLOW INDICATOR QUICK DISCONNECT.

AI. 6 OF 6 PAINT DISPENSERS WERE MISSING AND THE PARTS WASHER WAS NOT COMPLETELY INSTALLED.

AJ. HANGAR DOOR WAS INOP IN THE ELECTRICAL MODE BECAUSE OF A BROKEN UPPER PORT DOG (CASREP 08064).

AK. AIRCRAFT FUELING STATION NR 3 WAS INOP BECAUSE OF FAULTY CONTINUITY.

AL. AIRCRAFT FUELING STATION NR 1 HAD THE INLINE SUPPLY RISER GAGE INSTALLED ON THE DEFUEL LINE.

AM. FUELING AT SEA STATIONS NR 1 AND NR 5 RISER PRESSURE GAGES AND LINES WERE NOT INSTALLED.

AN. FLIGHT DECK AESS STATION NR 4, 440 VOLT POWER SUPPLY WAS INOP BECAUSE THE STATION WAS GROUNDED.

AO. FLIGHT DECK HELICOPTER LANDING SPOT 1, PORT AND STBD APPROACH DROP DOWN LIGHT BAR ELECTRICAL CABLES RAN ACROSS THE CATWALK NON-SKID, PRODUCING A SEVERE TRIP HAZARD. AP. STBD SHAFT ALLEY HAD APPROXIMATELY 40 SQ FT OF 5G CORROSION CAUSED BY LEAKING STERN TUBE SEALS.

AQ. OVERALL CCIMS CONDITION CODE WAS 2, WITH SOME CORROSION FOUND, BUT NO SYSTEM/COMPONENT FAILURE OBSERVED. MAINTENANCE ACTION IS REQUIRED AND AN IMMEDIATE CONCERN IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS: 03 LEVEL AFT NON SKID, UPPER STERNGATE (EYEBROW) HINGE SIDE, PORT AND STBD SIDE PORT DOOR COAMINGS, MOORING STATION VIEWING AND SHORE SERVICE PORTS.

AR. 17,000 OF 21,300 SQUARE FEET OF FLIGHT DECK NON-SKID SURFACE WAS DEGRADED WITH SEVERE CORROSION AND RUST BLEED THROUGH FROM WATER INTRUSION.

AS. THE SHIP'S SELF-ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY WAS EVALUATED AS SAT.

AT. HELMSMAN COULD NOT STEER BY DFGMC BECAUSE INDICATOR DID NOT PROVIDE DIRECTION OF TURN INDICATION IAW NSTM 420 TO ALLOW HELMSMAN TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS NEEDED TO JUDGE THE EFFECT OF RUDDER POSITION ON THE SWING OF THE SHIP'S HEAD.

AU. 54 OF 193 WATERTIGHT CLOSURES INSPECTED WERE NOT WATERTIGHT.

AV. 0 OF 2 IPDS WERE OPERATIONAL.

AW. 18 OF 18 VENTILATION AIRFLOW ALARMS WERE EITHER INOP OR MISADJUSTED.

AX. 17 CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES PRECLUDED OIL/WATER SEPARATORS CERTIFICATION.

AY. 5 SYSTEMS DID NOT HAVE PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM(PMS) INSTALLED. 3. STARRED DEFICIENCIES:

A. THE FOLLOWING SINGLE STARRED DEFICIENCIES WERE REPORTED CORRECTED BUT WERE FOUND TO STILL EXIST:

CARD NUMBER SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT STATUS

1G0004CC01 DWTS INSTALLATION AND SOVT CLOSED

1G0008CC01 TACTICAL SWITCHING SYSTEM SOVT CLOSED

1K0003OP01 BFTT TACTICAL TRAINER INSTALL CLOSED

1G0022OP01 AFT AEMS MAST CLIMBING SYSTEM CLOSED

B. THE FOLLOWING STARRED DEFICIENCIES WERE INCOMPLETE:

CARD NUMBER SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT STATUS

1G0002CC01 AN/WSC-6 OPEN

1G0003CC01 EMI CERT AND RADHAZ SURVEY OPEN

1G0009AX01 CHILLED WATER MIGRATION TEST OPEN

3. THE FOLLOWING CASREPS WERE ACTIVE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FCT:

A. NUMBER NOMENCLATURE                             CATEGORY

08015 CATHODE PROTECTION SYSTEM        2

08027 AFT MAST LADDER                      2

08029 AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM               2

08034 ROTATING ELECTRIC CRANE               2

08037 AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM               2

08040 AN/WSN 7 RING LASER GYRO               2

08042 STBD SIDE DOOR                             2

08043 SHIPS SERVICE SWITCHBOARD               2

08044 SCULLERY TRAY WASHER               2

08051 MK 46 GUN CONTROL CONSOLE        2

08052 BALLAST AIR COMPRESSOR               2

08055 INTRUSION ALARM                      2

08057 AFFF STATION NR 6                      3

08059 IPDS                                           2

08060 SMOKE EJECTION SYSTEM               2

08061 CPS                                           2

08062 SPS-48E RADAR SET                      2

08063 WELL DECK BRIDGE CRANE               2

08064 HELICOPTER HANGER                      2

08066 60HZ ELEC DISTRIBUTION SYS               2

08067 NAVSSI VME CARD RACK               2

08068 AN/WSC-6                                    2

08069 SLQ-32                                    2

08070 BOATS PERSONNEL                      2

08071 BOAT DAVIT                             2

08072 SPS-48E RADAR SET                      2

4. 9 DEPARTURES FROM SPECIFICATIONS (DFS) EXISTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FCT.

A. THE FOLLOWING DFS WERE IN EXCESS OF 180 DAYS:

NUMBER NOMENCLATURE DATE ISSUED

NONE.

B. THE FOLLOWING DFS WERE ISSUED TO SUPPORT COMPLETION OF THE FCT:

NUMBER NOMENCLATURE DATE ISSUED

LPD18-021-08 MAIN DRAINAGE 8/13/2008

5. 24 ACTIVE TEMPORARY STANDING ORDERS (TSO) EXISTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FCT.

A. THE FOLLOWING TSO WERE IN EXCESS OF 45 DAYS:

NUMBER NOMENCLATURE DATE        ISSUED

ENG 07-003 ELEC PLANT GENERAL        2/28/2007

ENG 07-006 ELEC PLANT GENERAL        8/5/2007

ENG 07-008 MN SEA WTR COOLING        8/17/2007

ENG 07-015 STEERING                      12/20/2007

ENG 08-017 SWITCHBOARDS               1/6/2008

ENG 08-024 SWITCHBOARDS               2/18/2008

ENG 08-025 TRIM                             2/18/2008

ENG 08-026 DAMAGE CONTROL STA        3/1/2008

ENG 08-028 ANCHOR HDLG AND STOW 4/29/2008

ENG 08-029 DIESEL SUPPORT SYS        5/15/2008

ENG 08-030 ATMOSPHERE CONTROL        5/29/2008

ENG 08-31 MOTORS AND ASSOC EQP        5/30/2008

ENG 08-033 PRECISION TRIM               5/30/2008

HM 07-001 HEARING CONSERVATION        2/5/2007

HM 07-002 HEAT STRESS MONITOR        2/6/2007

B. THE FOLLOWING TSO WAS ISSUED TO SUPPORT COMPLETION OF THE FCT:

NUMBER NOMENCLATURE DATE ISSUED

ENG 08-047 MAIN DRAINAGE 8/13/2008

6. DEMO RESULTS: SAT (0.80–1.00)/DEGRADED (0.60–0.79)/UNSAT (0.00–0.59): -SD DTE WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.55). SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES ARE LISTED IN THE SENIOR MEMBER COMMENTS OF THIS REPORT. -FULL POWER DEMONSTRATION WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.28). THE FULL POWER DEMONSTRATION WAS COMMENCED AT 100% FULL POWER AND WAS TERMINATED BECAUSE OF A FUEL OIL LEAK ON NR 1A MPDE FUEL OIL STRAINER BIMBA VALVE. -QUICK REVERSAL ASTERN COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED AT THE REQUIRED SPEEDS (SCORE: 0.00) BECAUSE OF EQUIPMENT PRE-REQUISITES NOT BEING MET IAW EOSS.

-QUICK REVERSAL AHEAD COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED AT THE REQUIRED SPEEDS (SCORE: 0.00) BECAUSE OF EQUIPMENT PRE-REQUISITES NOT BEING MET IAW EOSS. -STEERING DEMO WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.27). THE STEERING DEMO WAS CONDUCTED AT 80% POWER.

-STEERING CHECKS WERE INTERRUPTED BECAUSE OF CASUALTY TO 1 OF 4 MPDE.

-STEERING BLOCKING VALVE FAILED.

-STEERING PORT AND STBD HPU'S WERE OPERATING IN ALARM CONDITION (ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE LOW).

-STEERING PORT HEAD TANK WAS OUT OF SIGHT LOW.

-PORT TILLER LINK ASSEMBLY WAS UNDER LUBRICATED.

-ANCHORING DEMO WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.89).

-PORT ANCHOR REDUCTION GEAR HYDRAULIC MOTOR HAD A SIGNIFICANT HYDRAULIC OIL LEAK.

-ANCHOR CROSS OVER VALVE WAS LEAKING HYDRAULIC OIL. -BALLAST DEMO WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.87). 7. SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES AND EQUIPMENT OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (EOC) INCLUDE:

A. PROPULSION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.74):

-2 OF 2 MRG HIGH SPEED MAIN BEARING SIGHT FLOW INDICATORS HAD MISSING THERMOMETERS.

-2 OF 2 MRGS HAD LUBE OIL LEAKS.

-2 OF 2 CPP SYSTEMS HAD HYDRAULIC OIL LEAKS.

-2 OF 2 MRG LUBE OIL STRAINER TOWER BIMBA VALVES LEAKED LUBE OIL.

-2 OF 4 MPDE CRANKCASE VACUUM PRESSURE GAGES WERE INOP.

-4 OF 4 MPDE ROCKER LUBE OIL FIRESAFE STRAINER BOXES DID NOT ALLOW SHIP'S FORCE TO REMOVE AND CLEAN LEFT HAND STRAINER WITHOUT DISASSEMBLY OF FIRESAFE BOX AND REMOVAL OF INSTALLED PIPING.

-NR 1A MPDE BLOW-IN DOOR WAS INOP.

-NR 1A MPDE RIGHT TURBO AIR OUTLET PRESSURE TRANSDUCER WAS INOP.

-NR 1A MPDE COMBINED CYLINDER EXHAUST TEMPERATURE SENSOR WAS INOP.

-NR 1B MPDE HIGH FUEL OIL DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALARM WAS INOP.

-NR 2A MPDE LOW CLUTCH ALARM WAS MISADJUSTED.

-NR 2B MPDE E STOP DID NOT WORK PROPERLY.

-NR 4 SSDG BLOW-IN DOOR WAS MISADJUSTED.

-NR 5 SSDG HAD A FUEL LEAK AT FILTER INLET CONNECTION.

B. AUXILIARIES: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.73):

-ANCHOR CROSS OVER VALVE WAS LEAKING BY.

-METAL SHAVINGS WERE PRESENT IN STBD ANCHOR GEAR BOX SUMP.

-STEERING CHECKS WERE INTERRUPTED BECAUSE OF CASUALTY TO 1 OF 4 MAIN ENGINES.

-PORT STEERING HPU ACCUMULATOR WAS UNDERCHARGED.

-PORT AND STBD STEERING ACCUMULATORS FAILED TO HOLD CHARGE.

-PORT STEERING RETURN FILTER WAS MISSING INDICATOR LABEL.

-NR 1 AND NR 4 A/C WERE OOC.

-4 OF 7 A/C UNIT CONTROL PANELS WERE DEGRADED.

-7 OF 7 A/C UNITS HAD A PERMANENT EXTERNAL CABLE FOR THE SHIP'S ENGINEERING CONTROL SYSTEM (ECS/ICAS) THAT WAS PLUGGED INTO THE UNIVERSAL MICROPROCESSOR CONTROL PANEL EIA-STD-422 PORT LEAVING THE PROTECTIVE DOOR OPEN. WITH THE DOOR OPEN, THE 422 PORT IS EXPOSED TO THE SURROUNDING ENVIRONMENT (EMI, DUST, AND MOISTURE) WHICH CAN HAVE AN UNPREDICTABLE EFFECT ON THE MICROPROCESSOR MODULE.

-NR 1 LPAC HAD A FOULED HEAT EXCHANGER AND WAS OOC.

-NR 2 AND NR 3 LPAC WOULD NOT SHUT DOWN ON HIGH INJECTION WATER TEMP.

-NR 2 AND NR 8 FIRE PUMPS WERE OOC.

-NR 2 FIRE PUMP STARTED FROM DC DECK WHEN CONTROLLER WAS IN LOCAL.

-5 OF 10 FIRE PUMPS MECHANICAL SEALS WERE LEAKING.

-NR 2 SEA WATER SERVICE PUMP FAILED TO START REMOTELY.

-NR 3 SEA WATER SERVICE PUMP WAS OOC BECAUSE THE MECHANICAL SEAL WAS LEAKING UNCONTROLLABLY.

-4 OF 6 SEA WATER SERVICE PUMPS MECHANICAL SEALS WERE LEAKING.

-NR 1 AND 2 REVERSE OSMOSIS UNIT SHEAVE ALIGNMENTS AND BELT TENSIONS WERE NOT IAW PMS.

-WATER HEATER NR 1 LOWER ELEMENT WIRES WERE BURNT OFF.

-WATER HEATERS HAD NO PMS COVERAGE FOR HIGH TEMP SAFETY DEVICES. SWITCHES WERE SET AT 155 DEG VICE 140 DEG REQUIRED BY THE TECH MANUAL.

-WATER HEATER PMS MIP 5331/008-38 STATES MRC'S S-2 AND A-5 APPLY TO LPD 17 CLASS SHIP. PMS CARD A-5 CAN NOT BE PERFORMED ON LPD 17 INSTALLED HARDWARE.

-UPPER STERN GATE WAS MAKING A LOUD GRINDING NOISE WHEN OPERATED IN THE OPEN DIRECTION.

-1 OF 5 STERN GATE FULLY CLOSED PROXIMITY SWITCHES WAS NOT THE CORRECT MODEL.

-1 OF 4 BOLTS ON STERN GATE UPPER LINK ARM RETAINING PIN WAS LOOSE.

-LOWER STERN GATE OPERATION FAILED TO MEET THE 3-MINUTE REQUIREMENT WHEN CYCLED CLOSED. TESTING TIME WAS 3:20.

-NR 1 BALLAST HPU ACCUMULATOR WAS UNDER-CHARGED.

-NR 1 HPU HYDRAULIC OIL STORAGE TANK TLI WAS OOC.

C. ELECTRICAL: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.71):

-5 DEAD-ENDED CABLES WERE ENERGIZED AND NOT PROPERLY TERMINATED.

-NR 3 DEBALLAST AIR COMPRESSOR MOTOR CONTROLLER HAD A 3-STAR THERMAL IMAGING DISCREPANCY.

-NR 5 SSDG WAS UNAVAILABLE FOR ELECTRIC PLANT DYNAMIC TESTING BECAUSE THE GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSES UPON SSDG START UP (CASREP 08043).

-NR 2 SSDG WAS UNAVAILABLE FOR REVERSE POWER RELAY TESTING BECAUSE OF A CASUALTY TO UPS NR 72.

-NR 1 AND NR 2 SSDG ENCLOSURE EXHAUST FANS STOPPED DURING AIR DEFENSE DETECT-TO-ENGAGE DEMO. THIS RESULTED IN ENGINE SHUTDOWNS BECAUSE OF HIGH CRANKCASE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE.

-WHILE NOT SEEN DURING THE FCT, SHIP'S FORCE REPORTED LC 41/31 CIRCUIT BREAKER HAD INTERMITTENT UNCOMMANDED OPENINGS.

-4S-5S BUS TIE CIRCUIT BREAKER COULD NOT BE OPERATED REMOTELY.

-1 ENERGIZED ABT HAD WATER INTRUSION FROM CHILL WATER PIPING LOCATED IN THE OVERHEAD.

-2 ABT'S FAILED TO SHIFT IN THE AUTOMATIC MODE IAW PMS.

-1 ABT WOULD NOT TRANSITION FROM THE MANUAL TO AUTOMATIC MODE.

-5 POWER PANELS WERE GROUNDED.

D. DAMAGE CONTROL: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.70):

-AMR2 COULD NOT BE DEWATERED REMOTELY. 2 OF 2 AMR2 BILGE SUCTION VALVES WERE INOP REMOTELY (MD-V-01J, MD-V-01M). DEPARTURE FROM SPECIFICATION (DFS-LPD18-0021-08) WAS SUBMITTED IN ORDER TO CLEAR AMR2 FOR UNDERWAY OPERATIONS.

-AMR3 COULD NOT BE DEWATERED REMOTELY. NR 5 EDUCTOR (AMR3) OVERBOARD DISCHARGE VALVE (MD-V-6E) WAS INOP (SHIP REPORTED) AND BULKHEAD CROSS-CONNECT FROM MMR2-AMR3 (MD-V-032) WAS INOP REMOTELY.

-BULKHEAD CROSS-CONNECTS (MD-V-023 AND MD-V-025) FROM AMR2 TO LOWER VEHICLE STOWAGE ROOM WERE INOP REMOTELY.

-BULKHEAD CROSS-CONNECT FROM SHAFT ALLEY TO AMR3 (MD-V-01W) WAS INOP REMOTELY. TSO-47 WAS GENERATED TO ENSURE SHAFT ALLEY CAN BE DEWATERED REMOTELY.

-STBD STERNGATE MACHINERY ROOM SUCTION VALVE WAS SEIZED.

-STEERING GEAR RAM ROOM 1 EDUCTOR FIRMAIN ACTUATING AND CHECK VALVES LEAKED BY.

-FWD STBD WELLDECK EDUCTOR FIREMAIN ACTUATING VALVE WAS SEIZED.

-PORT STERNGATE MACHINERY ROOM OVERBOARD DISCHARGE AND FIREMAIN ACTUATING VALVES WERE INOP REMOTELY.

-PORT STERNGATE OPERATING ROOM SUCTION VALVE WAS INOP REMOTELY.

-FWD PORT WELLDECK EDUCTOR WAS INOP REMOTELY.

-CHAIN LOCKER EDUCTOR FIREMAIN ACTUATION VALVE LEAKED BY.

-VLS ROOM EDUCTOR FIREMAIN ACTUATING AND OVERBOARD DISCHARGE LEAKED BY. FIREMAIN AND DISCHARGE GAGES WERE OUT OF CALIBRATION.

-NR 1 WATERMIST SKID (5-48-2-Q) PUMP LEAKED OIL FROM NR 2, NR 4 AND NR 5 PISTONS AND LOCAL LUBE OIL MANIFOLD PRESSURE WAS 100 PSI VICE 70+/-5 PSI DURING NORMAL OPERATION.

-NR 2 WATERMIST SKID (5-128-3-E) PUMP HAD 5 OF 5 PISTONS LEAK LUBE OIL DURING NORMAL OPERATION AND LOCAL LUBE OIL MANIFOLD PRESSURE WAS 120 PSI VICE 70 +/-5 PSI DURING NORMAL OPERATION.

-UPPER VEHICLE STOWAGE AREA AFFF SPRINKLER GROUP 3 COULD NOT ACTIVATE AFFF STATION 4 REMOTELY.

-3 OF 4 FLIGHT DECK HOSEREELS WERE INOP. AFFF HOSEREEL NR 50, NR 52, AND NR 53 BECAME DISCONNECTED DURING OPERATION. IN ADDITION, AFFF HOSEREEL 53 NOZZLE LEAKED AND STATION UNION GASKET RUPTURED.

-NR 1 SCBA COMPRESSOR AIR FLASK DRAIN VALVE (AB-V-52) AND AIR FLASK BANK DRAIN THROTTLE VALVE (AB-V-53) LEAKED AIR DURING OPERATION.

-NR 2 SCBA COMPRESSOR AIR FLASK ISOLATION VALVE (AB-V-74) WAS TAGGED SHUT BECAUSE OF AN AIR LEAK AT THE AIR FLASK INLET UNION.

-NR 1 EMERGENCY BREATHING AIR COMPRESSOR (EBAC) HOSE RELIEF VALVE LEAKED DURING OPERATION.

-BREATHING AIR REDUCING STATION (BARS) WAS MISSING FROM INVENTORY.

-IMPROVED POINT DETECTION SYSTEM (IPDS) WAS INOP. IPDS EXTERNAL AIR SAMPLING UNIT (EASU) TUBES WERE NOT CONNECTED FOR SAMPLING.

-14 OF 41 FIREMAIN REMOTE OPERATED VALVES DID NOT HAVE A LOCAL CONTROLLER INSTALLED IAW SHIPSPEC 521-17 PARAGRAPH 521D.

-20 OF 58 BALLAST PRE-STAGE BLOW AND VENT VALVES WERE INOP REMOTELY.

-26 OF 86 VENT/BLOW VALVES WERE INOP REMOTELY (LOSS OF COMMUNICATION FROM ECS/DAU TO VALVES).

-4 OF 8 RAPID BALLAST TANKS SEA AND STRIPPING VALVES FAILED CLOSED DURING RAPID DEBALLASTING OPERATION BECAUSE OF ENGINEERING CONTROL SYSTEM (ECS) AND DATA ACQUISITION UNIT (DAU)

INTERFACE ERROR.

-PRESTAGE BALLAST TANK (8-80-0-W) WAS INOP BECAUSE OF INOP VENT VALVE (BALV-V-034).

E. DECK: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.74):

-WELL DECK TRAVELING BRIDGE CRANE WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED (CASREP 08063).

-TOW BOOM WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED (CASREP 08071).

-STBD SIDEPORT DOOR INSTALLATION WAS INCOMPLETE AND NOT DEMONSTRATED.

-SELF DEPLOYING SIDEPORT RAMP INSTALLATION WAS INCOMPLETE AND NOT DEMONSTRATED.

-2 OF 2 BULKHEAD-MOUNTED UPPER BOAT CRADLES WERE NOT DEMONSTRATED (LPD 17 CLASS ADVISORY NR 10-07).

-25 OF 34 WELL DECK VENTILATION FAN MOTORS DID NOT OPERATE AS DESIGNED.

-KNUCKLEBOOM CRANE INSULATOR LINK WAS MISSING WEIGHT TEST DOCUMENTATION. SHIP CANNOT LOAD CARGO/WEAPONS DURING HF TRANSMISSIONS.

-STBD ACCOM LADDER HYDRAULIC POWER FAILURE EMERGENCY RIGGING WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED. HANDRAIL AND BUMPER SECURING PINS WERE MISSING.

-PORT ACCOM LADDER WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED BECAUSE OF EXCESSIVE HYDRAULIC LEAKS IN THE SYSTEM.

F. OPERATIONS: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.73):

-AN/SPS-48E AIR SEARCH RADAR WAS SEVERELY DEGRADED BECAUSE OF RADAR AND ELECTRONIC COOLING WATER (ECW) DEFICIENCIES. RADAR COULD NOT TRANSMIT INTO FINAL POWER STAGE (CORRECTED). MOVING TARGET INDICATOR (MTI) FUNCTIONALITY FAILED PMS (CASREP 08062). DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING DETECTION TEST FAILED POWER OUTPUT PMS (CASREP 08062). ECW EXPANSION TANK WAS LOCATED AT THE SAME HEIGHT AS THE COOLING PUMPS AND WAS NOT INSTALLED PER AUX COOLING DIAGRAM 807 ICD 5035628. ECW PUMP IMPELLER COATING WAS FAILING, LEADING TO DEBRIS AND BLUE CHIPS INSIDE THE COOLANT LOOP (DEBRIS RETRIEVED FROM THE 105 MICRON MECHANICAL FILTER).

-AN/SPS-48E AIR SEARCH RADAR TECHNICAL MANUAL AND PMS FOR SYSTEM MINIMUM RESISTIVITY WERE NOT IN AGREEMENT AND OPERATION AND ALIGNMENT CSOSS WAS NOT INSTALLED.

-AN/SPS-73(V)13 SURFACE SEARCH RADAR PMS SUPPORT WAS INADEQUATE TO MAINTAIN THE SYSTEM AND SOFTWARE VERSION WAS OUTDATED (SOFTWARE VERSION 10.1.3 WAS INSTALLED VICE 11.0 OR HIGHER).

-AN/SLQ-32B(V)2 WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE ANTENNA ENCLOSURES DIFFERENTIAL AIR PRESSURE WAS OUT OF SPEC (CASREP 08069). REPAIR PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS EXIST, BUT REPAIR HAS NOT YET BEEN SCHEDULED. RECOMMEND ISEA ADVISE SHIP ON OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS BASED ON CURRENT MATERIAL CONDITION.

-PORT AND STBD AN/SLQ-32B(V)2 WAVEGUIDES INSIDE THE ANTENNA ENCLOSURES WERE NOT MECHANICALLY SUPPORTED.

-AFT ADVANCED ENCLOSED MAST SYSTEM (AEMS) HAD RECURRING CLASSWIDE SAFETY AND RELIABILITY DISCREPANCIES: NO MECHANICAL OR ELECTRICAL REDUNDANCY EXISTED TO RETRIEVE/EXTEND THE AFT MAST LADDER IN THE EVENT OF LOSS OF POWER OR WINCH MOTOR FAILURE. LADDER WAS UNSTABLE WHEN CLIMBING, DISPLACING APPROXIMATELY THREE INCHES NEAR THE TOP OF THE LADDER. CLIMBER SAFETY CABLE SYSTEM WAS INADEQUATE BECAUSE A FAILURE REQUIRES COMPLETE REPLACEMENT OF THE CABLE SAFETY SYSTEM, RENDERING IT UNUSABLE UNTIL REPLACED DURING A CONTRACTOR SUPPORTED PIERSIDE REPAIR. LADDER RUNGS (CIRCULAR TYPE) WERE SLIPPERY WITH HUMIDITY. WEIGHT TEST DATA WAS NOT POSTED ON THE LADDER. WEATHER DECK ACCESS DRAINAGE WAS INADEQUATE WITH POOLS OF STANDING WATER AND CORROSION HOT SPOTS. TACAN MAST REMOVABLE LADDER DID NOT HAVE A MEANS OF SECURING TOP OF LADDER ON THE TOP OF THE MAST. ANGLED SPS-48E RADAR DECK DID NOT HAVE ADEQUATE NON-SLIP DECK COVERING (360-DEG COVERAGE) INSTALLED TO MITIGATE FALL HAZARD.

-FWD AEMS HAD THE FOLLOWING DISCREPANCIES: FWD MAST LADDER RUNGS (CIRCULAR TYPE) WERE SLIPPERY WITH HUMIDITY, CREATING A SLIP HAZARD. FWD LADDER MOUNTING LOCATION IN RELATION TO THE IFF ANTENNA ARRAY REQUIRED AWKWARD MANEUVERING TO PREVENT DAMAGING IFF FEED HORNS WHILE TRANSITING FROM THE LADDER TO THE ANTENNA DECK. WEATHER DECK ACCESS DRAINAGE WAS INADEQUATE. WEIGHT TEST DATA WAS NOT DOCUMENTED AND LABEL PLATE WAS NOT ATTACHED TO THE LADDER.

-AN/UPX-29 IFF DIFFERENCE ANTENNA REFLECTED POWER VSWR WAS OUT OF SPEC.

G. WEAPONS: SAT (SCORE: 0.81):

-CONCRETE DECKS IN CARGO AMMUNITION MAGAZINE (CAM) NR 1, NR 2, NR 3, WHITE PHOSPHORUS MAGAZINE, CARGO PYRO MAGAZINE AND AVIATION READY SERVICE MAGAZINE HAD VARIOUS AREAS OF CRACKED CONCRETE AND CONCRETE LEVELS SET ABOVE THE DECK CHANNELS OR ON THE CHANNELS.

-CARGO AMMO MAGAZINE (CAM) NR 3 SPRINKLING SYSTEM WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE OF MISSING HEAT SENSING DEVICES (SWRMC DID NOT RECOMMEND INITIAL MAGAZINE SPRINKLER CERTIFICATION FOR CAM NR 3).

-FWD AND AFT MK 31 RAM GUIDED MISSILE ROUND PACK (GMRP) .5 TON CHAIN HOIST HAD EXPIRED WEIGHT TEST (MAR 08). SHIP COULD NOT LOAD RAM LAUNCHERS.

-FWD AND AFT MK31 RAM BARBETTES, LAUNCHER UNDERCARRIAGE AND TRUNNION ARMS HAD EXTREME HUMIDITY RESULTING IN MOLD AND MILDEW GROWTH AND CORROSION ON DECK EDGES AND WELD BEADS.

-FWD AND AFT MK 46 30MM GUN CONSOLE GUNNER'S DISPLAY PANEL (GDP) NUMERIC DISPLAY WAS DISTORTED (CASREP 08051).

-BOTH FWD AND AFT MK 46 30MM TURRET ELEVATED PLATFORM DECK GRATING CREATES A SAFETY HAZARD DURING AMMUNITION HANDLING EVOLUTIONS. ROUGH/SHARP SURFACE DESIGN OF GRATING CAN PUNCTURE

BRASS CASING OR STRIKE ROUND PRIMERS CAUSING ROUND DETONATION IF LOOSE ROUNDS FALL ONTO GRATING.

-HANDS FREE COMMUNICATION CIRCUITS WERE NOT INSTALLED NEXT TO BOTH THE MK 46 GUN MOUNT CONSOLES IN CIC, NOR IN THE GUN MOUNTS.

-MK46 30MM GUN SYSTEM WAS LOADED OUT WITH 1 OF 2 AMMUNITION HANDLING SKIP BOX PREVENTING THE SIMULTANEOUS MOVEMENT OF ROUNDS TO BOTH MOUNTS.

-FWD AND AFT MK 46 30MM GWS TOXIC GAS EJECTION SYSTEM WAS INSTALLED BUT NOT TESTED (TESTING SCHED NOV 08).

-FWD AND AFT MK46 30MM GUN MOUNTS ARE SUPPLIED OPERATING POWER FROM 100 AMP (MAX) BATTERY UNITS INSTALLED IN THE BARBETTES. BATTERIES ARE MAINTAINED WITH A MOUNTED BATTERY CHARGER, BUT IN THE EVENT OF A LOSS OF POWER, MOUNT OPERATORS IN CIC DO NOT HAVE INDICATIONS OF BATTERY CHARGE STATUS. IF A LOSS OF POWER OCCURS DURING TACTICAL OPERATIONS AND POWER IS NOT RESTORED QUICKLY, BATTERIES CAN BE DEPLETED BELOW MINIMUM DESIGN AMP LEVELS. SHOULD THIS OCCUR, THE GUN MOUNTS WILL BE UNAVAILABLE UNTIL POWER IS RESTORED AND BATTERIES HAVE BEEN RECHARGED (RECHARGE TIME APPROX 2-3 HOURS).

-CARGO AMMO MAGAZINE INTRUSION ALARMS WERE INOP. SHIP'S ARMORY AND SECURITY FORCE ISSUE INTRUSION ALARMS WERE NOT INSTALLED.

-ALL BIMETALLIC THERMOMETERS WERE MISSING CALIBRATION TAMPER SEALS.

-EMERGENCY LIGHTING WAS NOT INSTALLED TO ILLUMINATE THE MAJORITY OF THE MAGAZINE AND WEAPONS LOCKER HIGH SECURITY LOCKS.

-5 OF 18 SMALL ARMS READY SERVICE LOCKERS HAD THERMOMETER WELLS TOO SHALLOW TO ACCEPT THE BIMETALLIC THERMOMETERS.

-8 OF 18 SMALL ARMS READY SERVICE LOCKERS HAD UNSERVICABLE GASKETS.

-9 OF 18 SMALL ARMS READY SERVICE LOCKERS HAD DOGGING MECHANISMS THAT PREVENTED THE HIGH SECURITY LOCK FROM LOCKING ON THE HASP.

-5 OF 9 MATERIAL HANDLING FORK TRUCKS WERE INOP BECAUSE OF EXPIRED FORK TINE INSPECTIONS. 3 OF 3 4.5K REACH AND TIER FORK TRUCKS WERE TRANSFERRED TO AIMD FOR REPAIRS. 2 OF 3 4K ELECTRIC (EE) HYSTER FORK TRUCK HAD PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE CAGES REMOVED.

H. NAVIGATION: SAT (SCORE: 0.87):

-VMS SOFTWARE VERSION WAS NOT ECDIS-N COMPLIANT.

-1 OF 2 WSN-7 RING LASER GYRO NAVIGATION (RLGN) UNITS WAS OOC BECAUSE IMU AND INPUT/OUTPUT PROCESSOR CCA WERE INOP. (CASREP 08040)

-BAROMETER, MOUNTING BRACKET, AND AIR PRESSURE SAMPLING TUBING WAS NOT INSTALLED.

-VMS SOFTWARE VERSION 5.0 WAS NOT ECDIS-N COMPLIANT. I. COMMUNICATIONS: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.79):

-FOLLOWING SYSTEMS WERE NOT DEMONSTRATED BECAUSE SOVTS WERE NOT COMPLETE: AN/USC-38 EHF TIP, AN/SRC-57 DIGITAL WIDEBAND TRANSMISSION SYSTEM, TACTICAL SWITCHING SYSTEM AND AN/KSQ-1

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT DIRECTION SYSTEM.

-AN/SRC-60 ENHANCED POSITION LOCATION REPORTING SYSTEM WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED BECAUSE PARTICIPATING UNIT WAS NOT AVAILABLE.

-HF LONG HAUL WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO RADIATE THRU FWD HF ANTENNA 2-4 BECAUSE OF FAULTY FILTER AND HF ANTENNA 2-1 WHICH WAS SHORTED.

-IP SERVICES WERE NOT DEMONSTRATED VIA THE FOLLOWING SYSTEMS: T1 LINE, AN/WSC-6 SHF BECAUSE OF EQUIPMENT CASUALTY AND AN/USC-38 BECAUSE TIP WAS NOT SOVT.

-AN/URC-131 HFRG POWER OUT AND RECEIVER SENSITIVITY TESTING COULD NOT BE DEMONSTRATED BECAUSE OF LACK OF TEST EQUIPMENT. TEST EQUIPMENT WAS REQUIRED TO PERFORM MIP 4415/044-38 U-1 RECEIVER SENSITIVITY AND U-3 POWER OUT WHEN HF DEGREDATIONS ARE PRESENT.

-1 OF 1 AN/URC-131 HFRG NARROWBAND RADIO WAS INOP BECAUSE OF FAULTY POWER AMP INTERLOCK WHICH PREVENTED THE NARROW BAND SYSTEM FROM OPERATING, RESULTING IN NO HF LINK 11 CAPABILITIES.

-UHF LINK 11 FAILED OPERATIONAL CHECKS BECAUSE OF CONFIGURATION ISSUES.

-3 OF 3 AS-3772 HFRG NARROW BAND ANTENNAS WERE INOP AND PORT AND STBD AS-3771 HFRG RECEIVE ANTENNAS WERE DEGRADED.

-HFRG FAN WIRE ANTENNAS NR 2-1 AND 2-4 HAD HIGH VSWR. BOTH HFRG FAN WIRE ANTENNAS WERE STARTING TO SHOW SIGNS OF CORROSION AND SHIPS FORCE COULD NOT PERFORM ANTENNA MAINTENANCE BECAUSE OF ACCESSIBILITY WITHIN ENCLOSED MAST. SHIP HAD SUBMITTED FEEDBACK REPORT TO ADJUST PERIODICITY OF PMS TO AVAILABILITY PERIOD.

-6 OF 12 AN/USC-61 DMR VHF RADIOS WERE INOP BECAUSE OF FAULTY POWER AMPLIFIERS AND HUMAN MACHINE INTERFACE COMPUTER WAS NOT PROTECTED BY AN UPS.

-SIGINT ANTENNAS AS-142 (QTY 2), AS-420B (QTY 1) AND AS-2867 (QTY 2) WERE NOT INSTALLED AS REQUIRED BY DEPUTY DIRECTOR, EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE DIVISION (N75B) SERIAL LETTER N75/0U65149 WHICH AMENDED THE LPD 17 CLASS ORD TO INSTALL AN AUSTERE SIGINT CAPABILITY.

-AN/WSC-6 SHF SATCOM WAS INOP BECAUSE OF FAULTY MODEM (CASREP 08068). CLASS ISSUE OF AN/WSC-6 ANTENNAS LOSING SATELLITE TRACK BECAUSE OF EXCESSIVE VIBRATION DURING HIGH SPEED EVOLUTIONS WAS NOT VALIDATED (STARRED CARD FROM AT).

-SHIP REPORT OF AN/WSC-8 SHF SATCOM ANTENNA LOOSING TRACKING BECAUSE OF MAST BLOCKAGE COULD NOT BE VALIDATED.

-AN/USC-38 FOT WAS INOP BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO TRACK SATELLITES.

-AN/USC-38 EHF TERMINAL UPS BATTERY DID NOT HOLD TIME OR KEYMAT. RUBIDIUM STANDARD WAS OUT OF CAL (DUE JAN 2008). EXISTING EHF FOT RADOME HEATERS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED TO BE REPLACED BECAUSE OF DESIGN FLAWS. EHF ANTENNAS DID NOT HAVE WATERTIGHT HATCH TO PREVENT MOISTURE BUILD UP ON SENSITIVE ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS BECAUSE OF ANTENNA BEING MOUNTED ON TOP OF ENGINE INTAKE.

-PORT USC-38 EHF AND 3 OF 3 SHF ANTENNA PEDESTAL SPACES HAD INCOMPLETE WORK: CABLE/WAVEGUIDE TRUNK MANHOLE COVERS NOT BOLTED, MISSING SWITCH LABEL PLATES, PAINT INCOMPLETE ON PIPING, DEAD ENDED CABLES, ANTENNA SAFE SWITCH NOT LABELED, AND CORROSION FORMING ON BULKHEADS AND DECKS.

-2 OF 2 WSC-6 SHF ANTENNA DOMES AND 1 OF 1 WSC-8 SHF ANTENNA DOME HAD MULTIPLE HOLES IN THE SEAMS.

-3 OF 3 INSTALLED EPIRBS, SATFIND MODEL 1215 WERE THE INCORRECT TYPE IAW PMS AND NAVAL LITHIUM BATTERY PROGRAM AND REGISTRATION STICKERS WERE NOT ATTACHED.

-1 OF 2 AN/SYQ-26 NAVMACS SIDE B WAS INOP BECAUSE OF FAULTY CPU.

-AN/USG-2 CEC WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE DIGITAL DATA SYSTEM (BLACK SIDE) COULD NOT COMMUNICATE WITH COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT PROCESSOR (RED SIDE) RESULTING IN NO OFF SHIP CONNECTIVITY.

-NEW ORLEANS HAS AN ATM/PSAX SWITCH CONFIGURATION INSTEAD OF TIMEPLEX. MANY SHORE COMMANDS ARE NOT FAMILIAR WITH ATM/PSAX OPERATIONS WHICH COULD RESULT IN ADNS OR POTS LINES BEING DOWN FOR EXTENDED AMOUNTS OF TIME (SINGLE POINT OF FAILURE). SHIP HAS EXPERIENCED THIS PROBLEM WHILE IMPORT SAN DIEGO WITH OUTAGES LASTING UP TO 24 HOURS. OUTAGE IS ULTIMATELY RESOLVED BY CONTACTING NCTAMS PAC FOR ASSISTANCE.

J. INFORMATION SYSTEMS: SAT (SCORE: 0.92):

-SHIP WIDE AREA NETWORK (SWAN) NODE ROOM NR 4 SPACE TEMPERATURE WAS CLOSE TO 100 DEG F WITH SWITCH TEMPERATURES EXCEEDING 100 DEG. SPACE FAN COIL UNIT HAD BEEN SECURED AND TAGGED OUT WITHOUT NOTIFICATION TO INFORMATION SYSTEMS PERSONNEL.

-INTERNET PROTOCOL SERVICES VIA SHORE CONNECTION COULD NOT BE DEMONSTRATED BECAUSE OF CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED IN CUT-OVER. LPD 18 HAS A UNIQUE CONFIGURATION FOR THE SAN DIEGO WATERFRONT BECAUSE IT WAS ORIGINALLY OUTFITTED WITH AN ASYNCHRONOUS TRANSFER MODE (ATM) SWAN, AN/USQ-144(V)E ADNS SYSTEM, AND NO MULTIPLEXER FOR OFF-SHIP CONNECTION. AS A RESULT, NTCS SAN DIEGO HAD NOT GAINED PROFICIENCY IN ESTABLISHING THE SHORE CONNECTION AND SUCCESSFUL CUTOVER TO SHORE SERVICES TYPICALLY REQUIRED IN EXCESS OF 24 HOURS. INSTALLATION OF AN/USQ-144(V)J ADNS SYSTEM WILL CORRECT THIS PROBLEM, BUT IT IS NOT SCHEDULED UNTIL FY10.

-SWAN APL DATABASE DOES NOT CONTAIN INFORMATION FOR GIG-E SWAN HARDWARE. ADDITIONALLY, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE INTERACTIVE ELECTRONIC TECHNICAL MANUALS (IETMS) HAD NOT BEEN PROVIDED.

-AN/UYQ-92 BATTLE FORCE EMAIL (BFEM) WAS NOT TESTED BECAUSE THE SOVT WAS NOT COMPLETE.

-5 OF 27 SHIP WIDE AREA NETWORK (SWAN) UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLIES (UPS) WERE INOP (NR 9, NR 14, NR 24, NR 26, NR 59).

-SWAN UPS REMOTE MONITORING CAPABILITY THAT WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED IN THE SYSTEM IS NOT FUNCTIONAL AND IS A KNOWN CLASS

PROBLEM. ADDITIONALLY, THERE IS NO LOCAL AUDIBLE ALARM TO INDICATE THAT AN UPS HAS LOST SHIP’S POWER. ONLY AN OBSCURE RED CAUTION LIGHT INDICATES A LOSS OF SHIP’S POWER TO THE UPS.

-COMMS FROM SHIP SIGNAL EXPLOITATION SPACE (SSES) WERE DEGRADED WITH SOME CIRCUITS UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE AND OTHERS HAVING LIMITED TRANSMIT ONLY CAPABILITY. SATCOM VIA KIV-5 CRYPTO DEVICES NR 1,NR 2, AND NR 3 DID NOT TRANSMIT NOR KEY. COMMS VIA KY 58 CRYPTO DEVICES NR 1, 2, AND 3 DID NOT RECEIVE OR TRANSMIT CIPHER AND DID NOT RECEIVE IN PLAIN MODE. RECENT WORK ON SHIP SIGNAL EXPLOITATION SPACE (SSES) AND/OR RADIO PATCH PANELS WAS IDENTIFIED AS THE CAUSE OF ALTERED PATCHING PATHS REQUIRING A TRACE OF LINES TO DETERMINE PROPER PATCHING.

-AN/USQ-119 GCCS-M WAS DEGRADED. SOFTWARE WAS NOT LOADED TO PROGRAM OF RECORD (POR) CONFIGURATION AND HARDWARE WAS NOT INSTALLED IAW POR REQUIREMENTS.

K. SUPPLY: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.78):

-2 OF 9 GIH THERMOSTATIC FAIL-SAFE SWITCHES WERE OUT OF ANNUAL PERIODICITY.

-3 OF 9 GIH FIRE DAMPER SOLENOIDS FAILED.

-4 OF 9 GAYLORD HOODS HAD ZERO VENTILATION.

-SINGLE TANK TRAY DISHWASHER WAS INOP.

-2 OF 2, 150-LB WASHERS WERE EXPERIENCING EXCESSIVE VIBRATIONS DURING EXTRACT MODE.

-7 OF 16 REACH-IN REEFERS AND FREEZERS WERE INOP.

-5 OF 30 FOOD SERVING HOTWELLS WERE INOP.

-4 OF 5, 50-LB DRYER TEMPERATURE SETTINGS WERE SET BETWEEN 215 TO 220 DEG F VICE THE REQUIRED 160 DEG F.

-1 OF 3 BULK ICE MACHINES WAS INOP.

-8 OF 8 SELF-SERVICE DRYERS WERE NOT INSTALLED WITH SECONDARY LINT FILTERS.

-2 OF 8 SELF-SERVICE DRYERS WERE INOP.

-2 OF 8 SELF-SERVICE WASHERS WERE INOP.

L. HABITABILITY: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.79):

-DECK IN AVIATION BERTHING (2-95-1-L) WAS DEGRADED TO A POINT OF REQUIRING IMMEDIATE REMOVAL AND RESURFACING.

-EMERGENCY EGRESS KICKOUT PANELS THROUGHOUT CREW'S BERTHING WERE NOT LABELED IN ACCORDANCE WITH NSTM CHAP 79 VOL 2.

-STRATICA DECK TILES THROUGHOUT BERTHINGS, STATEROOMS, AND PASSAGE WAYS WERE DELAMINATING, DAMAGED, LOOSE, OR MISSING.

-40 OF 40 PIECES OF PHYSICAL FITNESS EQUIPMENT WERE NOT PROPERLY SECURED FOR SEA.

-SHOWER SEALANT WAS DEGRADED THROUGHOUT SHIP SANITARY SPACES.

M. NAVOSH: SAT (SCORE: 0.84):

-8 OF 15 TRUNK SAFETY NETS WERE NOT MANUFACTURED AND INSTALLED IAW NAVSEA DRAWING 804-5184163 REV A.

-102 OF 265 COMPRESSED GAS CYLINDERS THOUGHOUT THE SHIP LACKED PROPER RESTRAINTS TO MEET CLASS B SHOCK MOUNTING IAW NAVSEA STD DRAWING NUMBER 803-5184287. HFP CYLINDERS HAVE A LARGER DIAMETER (6 3/8 INCHES) THAN STANDARD NAVY COLLAR (5 7/8 INCHES) PRECLUDING PROPER SECURING IN STOWAGE RACKS WITH THE COLLAR PROVIDED TO THE SHIP.

-3 OF 3 HAZMAT SPILL KITS WERE NOT COMPLETE.

-SEVERAL ERRORS WERE FOUND IN COMBAT SYSTEMS AND ENGINEERING TAG OUT LOGS THAT WERE NOT IDENTIFIED DURING WEEKLY AUDITS OR BY SHIP'S FORCE AUTHORIZING OFFICERS.

-4 OF 8 REEFER AND FREEZERS IN MEDICAL WERE INOP.

-VALVES FOR OPERATION OF EMERGENCY POTABLE WATER SUPPLY IN MAIN, FWD, AND AFT BDS WERE NOT LABELED.

-MEDWEB DIGITAL XRAY IMAGING SYSTEM WAS NOT LINKING WITH SUPPORTING HOSPITALS TO SEND XRAYS FOR RADIOLOGICAL DOCTOR REVIEW UNDERWAY.

-DEHYDRATOR SYSTEM WAS INSTALLED AT THE FEET OF PATIENT CHAIR IN DENTAL OPERATORY VICE THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BULKHEAD.

-14 OF 14 SIZE D OXYGEN CYLINDER STOWAGE RACKS THROUGHOUT MEDICAL AND DENTAL WERE MISSING VERTICAL COLLAR MOUNTS.

-PASSAGEWAY OUTSIDE MEDICAL STORE ROOM NR 1 WAS UNFINISHED (BARE METAL).

-MULTIPLE POTABLE WATER DRAINS WERE NOT PROPERLY AIR GAPPED.

-POTABLE WATER PLACARDS WERE MISSING FROM ALL WASHDOWN RISERS. N. VENTILATION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.68):

-20 OF 94 SANITARY SPACES HAD EXHAUST AIRFLOW BELOW DESIGN SPEC. 13 OF THE 20 SPACES BELOW DESIGN SPEC WERE BECAUSE TWO EXHAUST SYSTEMS WERE NOT OERATING PROPERLY.

-14 OF 31 INDUSTRIAL SPACES HAD EXHAUST AIRFLOW BELOW DESIGN SPEC.

-11 OF 18 AIRFLOW ALARM PANELS WERE DE-ENERGIZED AND 1 WAS MISSING A CIRCUIT CARD. 18 OF 18 PANELS WERE MISSING THE ALARM SETPOINT VALUES.

O. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.59):

-4 OF 4 PLUMBING WASTE ASPIRATOR PUMPS HAD LEAKING MECHANICAL SEALS.

-SEWAGE EJECTOR PUMPS 2B AND 2C LEAKED BY IN AFT VCHT PUMP ROOM.

-SEWAGE EJECTOR PUMPS 1A AND 1B IN FWD PUMP ROOM HAD LOW MECHANICAL SEAL OIL LEVELS.

-PERSONNEL DID NOT HAVE ANY TRAINING MATERIAL OR PQS FOR THE SOLID WASTE EQUIPMENT AND HAD NOT BEEN TRAINED ON ANY OF THE EQUIPMENT.

-ODS/REFRIGERANT LOG DID NOT ACCURATELY REFLECT LOSS AND USAGE AND ONLY HAD TWO MONTHS OF DATA.

-OWMP UNIT 1A "HIGH DISCHARGE PRESSURE" ALARM CAUSED THE SYSTEM TO SHUT DOWN UNDER NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS. OPERATING PRESSURES AT SHUTDOWN DID NOT MATCH REQUIRED SHUTDOWN PARAMETERS PER TECH MANUAL.

-OWMP UNIT 1B PANEL-MATE DISPLAY DOES NOT COMMUNICATE PROPERLY WITH SYSTEM PLC CPU. SYSTEM WAS INOP BECAUSE OF PANEL-MATE COMMUNICATION ISSUE.

-OWMP DID NOT DISPLAY "PLC BATTERY NEEDS REPLACED" WARNING ALARM WHEN PLC BATTERY WAS REMOVED.

-OWMP PT2, PT3, AND PT4 PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS WERE INOP.

-EOSS DIAGRAM AND PROCEDURE FOR OWMP UNITS 1A AND 1B WAS INCORRECT AND DID NOT MATCH ACTUAL SHIPBOARD EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION.

-VARIOUS VALVES WERE NOT PROPERLY LABELED WITH VALVE NUMBER AND VALVE NOMENCLATURE PER NAVSEAINST 9593.

-OWU-V-18, PERMEATE CONTROL VALVE ELECTRO-PNEUMATIC POSITIONER WAS INOP.

-OIL WATER SEPARATOR (OWS) NR 1A AND 1B WERE NOT OPERATED IN AUTOMATIC MODE BECAUSE OF CONTAMINATION OF AFFF IN THE OILY WASTE HOLDING TANK.

P. AVIATION: SAT (SCORE: 0.89):

-FOLLOWING FLIGHT DECK AEL EQUIPMENT WAS NOT ONBOARD: 3 OF 52 MK-1 LIFE VESTS, 10 OF 52 CRANIALS, 17 OF 104 JERSEYS, AND 4 PAIR OF FLYERS GLOVES.

-6 OF 24 WHITE/NVD OVERHEAD HANGAR LIGHTS WERE INOP.

-SOUND PROOF BOOTH WAS NOT INSTALLED IN THE JP-5 PUMP ROOM.

-DIGITAL WIND SYSTEM WAS INOP BECAUSE THE REAL TIME SYSTEM NR 1 (RTS) WAS DOWN.

-SGSI INSTALLATION DATA WAS NOT POSTED OR ENGRAVED ON THE F100 ENCLOSURE.

-AVIATION MAINTENANCE KNUCKLE CRANE COULD BE OPERATED EITHER LOCAL OR REMOTE AT THE SAME TIME.

-AVIATION MAINTENANCE KNUCKLE CRANE DID NOT HAVE UPPER OR LOWER LIMIT SWITCHES INSTALLED ON THE FALLS ASSEMBLY.

-FLIGHT DECK WHEEL STOP COAMING ACCESS INSPECTION PANELS ARE DIFFICULT TO REMOVE FOR PERIODIC CORROSION INSPECTIONS AND MAINTENANCE, REQUIRING 4100 FASTENERS BE REMOVED TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS.

Q. SHIPBOARD PRESERVATION: SAT (SCORE: 0.87):

-9 OF 18 SMALL ARMS READY SERVICE LOCKERS HAD MODERATE SURFACE CORROSION ON EXTERNAL SURFACES.

-ICCP SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY NR 3 WAS INOP (CASREP 08015).

-ICCP SYSTEM HAD A COMMUNICATION ERROR BETWEEN THE ICCP COMPUTER CONTROLLER AND POWER SUPPLY NR 1.

-ICCP SYSTEM COMPUTER CONTROLLER DID NOT INDICATE AN OVER/UNDER PROTECTED ALARM WHEN TESTED.

-4 OF 4 ICCP POWER SUPPLIES HAD INCORRECTLY ROUTED 440 VAC INPUT LEADS.

-4 OF 4 SHAFT GROUNDING SYSTEM SLIP RING ASSEMBLIES HAD UNEVEN JOINTS RESULTING IN CHATTERING OF BRUSH ASSEMBLIES.

-VAPOR-PHASE CORROSION INHIBITORS (VCI) WERE NOT BEING UTILIZED IN ALL ELECTRICAL ENCLOSURES LOCATED IN HIGH HUMIDITY AREAS IAW PMS. -STBD STERNGATE MACHINERY ROOM (4-190-1-Q) AND PORT STERNGATE MACHINERY ROOM (4-190-2-Q) LOWER LEVEL BILGES HAD ENTRAPPED WATER AND HAD GRADE 7S DPOT CORROSION AT THE BULKHEAD AND DECK WELD JOINTS.

-FLAMMABLE GAS CYLINDER STOREROOM (2-D-2-K) PORT BULKHEAD FRAME D TO FRAME 10 WAS MISSING APPROX 7' X 60' LENGTH LAGGING AND PAINT COATING ATTRIBUTING TO A GENERAL CORROSION GRADE 9G.

-VOID ACCESS (3-120-2-V) HAD GENERAL RUNNING RUST WITH AN CORROSION GRADE OF 5G.

-BALLAST TANK (8-D-0-W) MANHOLE ACCESS (6-75-2-W) HAD GRADE 9S SPOT RUST AND TANK SIDES, T-BARS, MIDPLATFORM, LOWER LEVEL HAD CORROSION GRADE 8S.

-PORT SIDE 04 LVL WEATHERDECK HAD INSUFFICIENT WATER DRAINAGE CAPABILITY, RESULTING IN DECK CORROSION AND 10 FT OF NON SKID PEELING, MISSING, OR RUSTING.

7. ADDITIONAL DATA:

A. COMMISSIONING DATE: 3/5/2007.

B. NEXT CNO AVAIL: JAN 2010.

8. RDML R. M. KLEIN, PRESINSURV, WAS PRESENT FOR THE INSPECTION. CAPT W. GALINIS, PMS 317, LCDR R. SAUNDERS, CNSF REP WERE PRESENT FOR THE INSPECTION AND OUT-BRIEF. CAPT T. SNYDER WAS THE SENIOR INSPECTOR. MIKE MURPHY, PORT ENGINEER, WAS PRESENT FOR THE INSPECTION/OUT-BRIEF.

9. PRESIDENT, BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY, CONCURS WITH THE FINDINGS.//