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Fire review blames GW leadership

SAN DIEGO — The Navy’s Pacific Fleet commander called the May 22 fire aboard the aircraft carrier George Washington “entirely preventable,” slammed its leadership and criticized two dozen others for numerous problems with storing hazardous materials and flammables, lax procedures and insufficient inspections, damage-control training, and drills.

Poor follow-ups into known dangers aboard the nuclear-powered ship led to the blaze that injured two dozen crew members, burned through 80 spaces and caused $70 million in damage, Adm. Robert Willard wrote July 29 in a strongly worded review and endorsement of the Navy’s investigative report into the incident.

The report

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Willard also wrote that the actions of senior fleet leaders — including the two-star admiral in charge of Naval Air Forces Atlantic and the one-star head of the carrier strike group — “did little to assist USS George Washington to be better prepared to deal with a fire of this magnitude.”

He added that, in the future, Pacific and Atlantic fleet leaders “must demand more complete oversight and hands-on engagement in [unit-level training] corrective actions by” type commanders and immediate superiors in charge, and their staffs.

The investigation was led by Rear Adm. Frank Drennan, who leads Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command in San Diego. The Navy made the report public Friday.

The investigation led to the firing of the ship’s commanding officer and executive officer. The Navy also handed down nonjudicial punishments to six GW crew members for negligence and dereliction of duty.

Multiple failures

The fire, which investigators believe was sparked by lit or discarded cigarettes, began in space 6-189-1-Q, an unmanned auxiliary boiler exhaust and supply uptake space; such spaces are ventilation trunks.

“This fire was entirely preventable,” Willard wrote in his seven-page endorsement. “The ship’s Chief Engineer had personally discovered below deck plates in an Auxiliary Boiler Room the improperly stored hazardous material that would eventually fuel this conflagration. He had ordered it properly disposed of and informed senior leadership up to and including the [executive officer] of his discovery.

“Even after his order to turn in the more than 300 gallons of [hazardous material] was violated and 90 gallons of the flammable liquid was placed in the uptake space, a questioning attitude by any one of the officers and enlisted personnel who [knew of] the Chief Engineer’s discovery could have led to the material’s recovery before the fire. Additionally, senior leadership had allowed shipboard inspection processes to lapse to the point that HazMat could be improperly stowed within the ship with little likelihood of discovery.”

He went on to cite “numerous processes and procedures related to the fire prevention and readiness and training for firefighting and firefighting management onboard” that weren’t functioning properly.

Those failures to follow existing procedures and training programs, in turn, caused lags in the fire’s discovery in the ventilation trunk and ultimate efforts to put out the then-spreading fires, Willard found.

“The extent of damage ... could have been reduced had numerous longstanding firefighting and firefighting management deficiencies been corrected,” he wrote. “Shortcomings” in the ship’s programs for damage control training, along with maintenance and material management, “undoubtedly contributed to the delays in discovery and decision making during the firefighting effort.

“It took leadership nearly eight hours to conclude that the uptake space was the source of the fire and to begin to extinguish it,” he noted.

By then, the fire had spread up eight decks and across 80 spaces.

“While team leaders and firefighters did a credible job fighting numerous fires under the circumstances, had the deficiencies in equipment and level of knowledge been corrected, the extensive damage to USS George Washington could have been contained.”

‘Systemic’ problems

The carrier, with more than 4,000 sailors aboard, was operating in international waters off the Galapagos Islands when the fire broke out.

During its pre-deployment training, the George Washington fell under Carrier Strike Group 8, who at the time was Rear Adm. Philip Cullom, as the immediate superior-in-charge. The type commander was Naval Air Force Atlantic commander Rear Adm. John Goodwin.

Willard wrote in his endorsement of his concern of “possible shortcomings in ISIC and TyCom oversight” while the carrier was under Fleet Forces Command as it went through its unit-level training and subsequent transit to the Pacific.

He also sounded a warning bell to the carrier fleet. He didn’t specifically elaborate.

“Many of the deficiencies in USS George Washington appear to be systemic and may call for an overhaul of TyCom-led CVN manning and training processes during the (unit level training) period,” Willard wrote.

The investigation found “serious flaws in the carrier Unit Level Training program,” Willard wrote.

He recommended that Fleet Forces Command, Pacific Fleet and Naval Air Force Pacific weigh ordering more-frequent inspections from afloat training groups; more scrutiny and oversight from TyCom and strike group commanders; stronger measures of shipboard performance; and a review into the follow-up actions when major deficiencies are found in critical areas, including damage control training.