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InSurv prep means extensive outside help

The funding and manning climate in today’s surface fleet makes it difficult for ships to get into shape for their major inspections without outside assistance, according to an internal case study detailing one cruiser’s preparations.

For the Norfolk, Va.-based cruiser San Jacinto, it took the ship’s company, plus as many as 87 extra people from 16 commands working as much as three months in advance, to set the ship up for its material inspection by the Board of Inspection and Survey. A Navy message detailing those arrangements, written by the cruiser’s commander, Capt. John Cordle, made clear that without the extra help, San Jacinto would have failed.

“Bottom line: The maintenance community is not currently structured and the business practices do not currently support the large volume of work which inevitably must take place to prepare a ship for InSurv,” said the message, obtained by Navy Times. “The significant labor pool which rallied in support of SJA contributed greatly to preparations for the M.I. Without this additional manpower SJA would not have been ready for the M.I.”

The story of San Jacinto’s InSurv preparations demonstrates the Navy’s acceptance of ships bringing in external help to get in shape for inspections — not only because ships’ core crews have gotten smaller, but because crews shrink even more depending on a ship’s place in its deployment cycle, said Bob Butler, deputy fleet maintenance officer for Fleet Forces Command.

According to Cordle’s message, cruisers today have about 44 fewer sailors than before the onset of “optimal manning.” And because San Jacinto had recently come back from a deployment, its ship’s company was even smaller, Butler said.

He didn’t have an exact number of the deficit in the ship’s crew, but generally the dip can be as many as 20 people.

The ship returned from deployment in late March. Its material inspection took place Aug. 3-7.

But Butler said the borrowing of workers from across the waterfront to prepare for an inspection was a long-standing practice.

“What they did and how they prepared is exactly how we expected to see. None of that was unique,” Butler said.

A disturbing sign?

One retired cruiser commander, who asked not to be identified because of his ongoing ties to the Navy, said the heroic effort described by San Jacinto’s message showed that the fleet’s daily routines were broken.

“What this suggests is that optimal manning doesn’t create a situation in which a ship, using only its own assets, can succeed in InSurv,” he said.

“I think that the record of known failures, particularly in cruisers, is beginning to speak for itself: Rode hard, put away wet; too much time away from home; too little time getting repaired; and too little money and planning dedicated to it.”

San Jacinto didn’t just need extra people to get the ship squared away, according to the message. Ninety days beforehand, officials assessed that the ship needed about $1.5 million in repairs and at least six extra days underway, which later become 10.

“An exceptional amount of energy had to be expended in order to overcome the inertia of a huge maintenance backlog in only 90 days,” the message said.

The funding eventually came, but only after high-level finagling, according to the message: “In the end SJA received a great deal of the necessary support, but this required constant engagement at the O-6 and above level.

“There is no substitute for performing the checks at sea. Additional underway days must be budgeted for ships to get underway and conduct InSurv preps,” the CO wrote. “Ships should not have to justify the need to get underway to practice for InSurv. This should be a recognized cost of preparing a ship for this rigorous inspection.”

One team, one InSurv

The cruiser San Jacinto needed help from 16 commands throughout Naval Station Norfolk, Va., to get ready for its inspection. The commands that shared people and the number of sailors they gave, from 30 to 90 days before the inspection:

Enterprise Carrier Strike Group, 4; carrier Enterprise, 4; cruisers Leyte Gulf, 1; Monterey, 1; Vella Gulf, 2; destroyers Bulkeley, 1; Gravely, 10 people per day for 90 days; Jason Dunham, 10 people per day for two weeks; Ramage, 1; Roosevelt, 1; dock landing ship Carter Hall, 2; amphibious assault ship Nassau, 1; Cruiser Class Squadron, 3; Destroyer Class Squadron, 10 people per day for 90 days; Transient Personnel Unit Norfolk, 10 people per day for 90 days; Navy Reserve: 26 sailors for a total of 511 workdays.

DISCUSS: The San Jacinto