The surface Navy is starting to find itself outgunned, and if it doesn't catch up soon it could be cowed by potential adversaries such as China or Iran.
That's the contention of two retired naval officers turned analysts, who recently told lawmakers about strategies to make the surface fleet relevant against adversaries armed with mines, jets and long-range anti-ship missiles. , who testified before a House subcommittee April.
Bryan McGrath, a retired commander and former destroyer skipper, told the a House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee hearing that today's surface Navy is less prepared to fight and defeat a sophisticated adversary than the Cold War-era Navy of 25 years ago.
The surface force has to adapt McGrath, testifying with fellow retired Cmdr. Bryan Clark, a former submariner and analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, argued that to compete with China and other foes who are seeking to block the U.S. Navy's access to key strategic points on the globe, McGrath said. And with that will come a fundamental rethinking of Navy strategy. Instead of encircling the aircraft carrier, McGrath said ships like destroyers and cruisers should be dispatched to gain sea control and clear the path for a carrier to launch airstrikes before moving elsewhere.
According to McGrath, for the surface Navy to be effective, it has to fundamentally change the way it fights -- moving away from a model where the carrier is the main offensive weapon and the surface ships protect it, to a model where the surface fleet can fight at extended ranged to win control, clearing the way for the carrier to safely launch strikes.
"In an era of little or no threat, the Navy packed its defenses around the carrier and positioned itself close to an adversary in order to generate maximal combat sorties," McGrath said at the open hearing on April 15. "Against a high-end, near-peer competitor, implementing an [anti-access, area denial] strategy, this is on longer possible.
"In the future the carrier strike group will have to fight its way into portions of the ocean from which it can then execute strikes. And then quickly retire and or relocate."
While the Navy has been focused on low-end missions, potential enemies such as China and Iran have adapted, said Bryan Clark, a retired Navy commander, who explained that their goal is to keep the U.S. Navy out of , testified that The goal isn't to fight the U.S. Navy head on, the goal is to keep the Navy out of striking distance with a barrage of shore-based missiles that will overwhelm the defenses of an AEGIS cruiser or destroyer.
Clark argued that An otential adversaryies could, with relative ease, force a DDG to shoot all its missiles and overwhelm its defenses — taking it out of the fight for about 1/10th the cost of the $1.8 billion Arleigh Burke-class destroyerDDG.
'Legacy force'
The major disadvantage is that technology has advanced to the poin?t where enemy aircraft, surface ships and submarines pack missiles that have a longer range than those on U.S. ships. For Clark, that means the Navy has to invest in new missiles that can hit the enemy before they are in range to fire their missiles; to shoot the archer before he looses his arrows.
"Today, the surface ships we deploy don't have weapons that are able to reach enemy aircraft ships or submarines until we are already well within range of their anti-ship cruise missiles" Clark testifiedsaid. "The way you get out of that is you have to deploy some new weapons."
Clark said that some progress has been made already. The cruiser Normandy, which deployed with the Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group, is packing SM-6 interceptors missiles that can strike reach enemy aircraft outside of the range of the range of most current anti-ship cruise missiles.
i AN REACH 1000 MILES. COULDN'T IT BE USED TO TAKE OUT SHORE BATTERIES? But that's about the only good news, since the U.S. Navy lacks anti-ship missiles , because we don't have a similar capability on the anti-ship side, and certainly not when it comes to anti-submarine warfare.
"The anti-submarine rocket I've got on board a ship has a range of about 12 miles," he said. "Whereas the anti-ship cruise missiles that Chinese submarines can carry have a range of a couple hundred miles, and launched comfortably from a range of 100 to 150 miles.
"We need new weapons that allow us to extend the range," Clark added.
Clark said the Navy is developing a long range anti-surface missile, but that it needs to focus on anti-submarine missiles as well.
The other sea change for the surface Navy, Clark argues, is that it needs to stop shooting down incoming missiles a hundred miles from the ship. That's a waste of missiles, Clark says, because because it's a waste of missiles in an environment where the enemy is trying to get you to expend all the rounds in your chamber.
His alternate strategy: letting The Navy should let those missiles come within range of close-in weapons such as the new Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile, CIWS Phalanx, or future weapons like a laser or, the rail gun,a high powered microwave to intercept them, saving missiles for longer-range strikes on enemy ships, fighters and shore targets. before killing them, even though the pucker-factor is much higher, Clark said. That means the Navy can save its vertical launch system cells for fighting the archers instead of the arrows.
Another mitigating strategy is to have missiles that can provide a dual function so ships can conserve real estate in their vertical launch magazines. For example, Clark said, the long-range anti-ship missile in development can be modified to function as a long-range strike missile as well. This eliminates the need to have separate cells for Tomahawk strike missiles and anti-ship missiles in an environment where every missile cell is a commodity.
Ultimately, McGrath argued, the Navy needs to see surface forces as offensive weapons, rather than simply air defense platforms to protect the flattop aircraft carrier.
"I think we have to begin to questions whether or not air superiority that's required for surface operations can be provided by the ships themselves," McGrath said in his closing statement.
"I'm not saying we should drive three-ship [surface action groups] into the Taiwan Strait, I'm saying that the Chinese [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] structure is not equally good throughout its entire volume, and there are places within it where surface forces will be able to operate, will be able to create mayhem, and will be able to hold [valuable] target at risk."
The approach that McGrath advocates, using sea control to penetrate an anti-access, area-denial environment has its critics. isn't without its detractors. Retired Capt. Jerry Hendrix, an former naval flight officer and former director of Naval History who now serves as an analyst with the Center for a New American Security, said sea control strategies aren't the best approach to an A2AD threat like the one posed by China.
Instead of investing in legacy forces, the Navy should invest in a new force that can project force and bring the full strike capability of the Navy to bear, he said. Such an investment would be a long-range drone that is capable of strike from outside the A2AD envelope.
"Today, despite the fact that we are building $14 billion aircraft carriers and we are spending $16 billion a year on aircraft, we are still not buying either an airplane or a ship that can consistently project power from outside the A2AD environment," Hendrix said.
"So what's being argued for is a justification for the legacy force, rather than investing in a new force that will allow us to continue a power projection strategy."
David B. Larter was the naval warfare reporter for Defense News.